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A Future, but at what Cost? Cuba and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea’s Quest for Sustainable Development  
This paper looks at the question of development by focusing on both Cuba 
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. At the heart of the project 
is the notion of sustainability, and how to achieve well-being even in the 
most challenging conditions, isolated economies, and sanction-laden 
realities. This is done by tracing both countries’ engagement and 
development in the fields of health and education. We suggest that political 
engagement with these countries should be prioritised, without challenging 
an established political order but with its consent, and with the hope that 
future generations are socialized to a culture of openness. 
Keywords: Cuba; DPRK; Development; Sustainability; Rogue States 
Introduction 
In 1992, James Blight and Aaron Belkin were busy trying to make sense of the 
new landscape created by the end of the Cold War. They were particularly concerned 
with the state of nuclear deterrence now that the Soviet Union was disintegrating, and 
what would become what they called ‘the USSR’s Third World Orphans.’ For them, 
former Soviet clients were also, just like the rest of the world, entering their own period 
of uncertainty. Some states were more concerning than others: Cuba and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (thereafter DPRK) were thought to be at the ‘leading edge of 
a multidimensional process of deterioration whose ingredients include unrelenting anti-
American rhetoric, untimely ideological commitment, and aging charismatic leaders.’1
This was of importance to the United States and how it was to delineate a new 
international relations and interactions perimeter, and define its own role in this unipolar 
moment. George H.W. Bush’s ‘Toward a New World Order’ speech given on September 
11, 1990 to the American Congress had already hinted at new directions, and at the fact 
that the United States would commit to lead the world toward a rule of law, protecting 
the weak with partner countries and institutions, and bring about a collectivist world order 
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under the moral authority of the United Nations. With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and 
the swift United Nations military response led by the United States, international 
expectations rose and unstable and problematic Third World Orphans, or ‘backlash states’ 
such as Cuba, the DPRK, Iran or Libya could potentially, according to United States 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, be neutralized, and eventually transformed into 
‘constructive members of the international community.’2
A quarter of a century later, a lot has changed: few backlash or ‘rogue’ states 
remain, and a number of dictators such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussain and Libya’s Muammar 
Gaddafi have passed away. Yet, much remains the same for Cuba and the DPRK, two 
Third World Orphans often described as ‘unrepentant, unredeemable, old-fashioned 
Marxist-Leninist states with one foot in the grave’.3 Both states have continued to be 
heavily sanctioned by the international community4 and the United States in particular 
for their violation of freedom of speech, assembly and press, engagement with narcotic 
traffickers and lack of democratic engagement. Nevertheless, both states have also been 
engaged by the international community: Pope Francis’ diplomatic brokering paved the 
way for American President Barack Obama’s visit to Cuba in 2016 and its involvement 
in the 2017 FARC peace deal in Colombia, while the DPRK has more recently featured 
heavily in the news when its leader Kim Jong Un met with US President Donald Trump 
in a bilateral summit organised in Singapore. In some cases, they have also signed treaties, 
such as the now-defunct 1994 Agreed Framework or the Six-Party Talks September 15, 
2007 Agreement aimed to freeze Pyongyang’s nuclear programme. Both countries have 
also had to face and manage the death of their founding fathers and leaders, and settled 
into a pattern of patrimonial transitions, from one father onto his son and grandson (for 
the DPRK, with Kim Jong Il upon Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994 and with Kim Jong Un 
upon Kim Jong Il’s death in 2011), or from one brother to another (for Cuba, with Raul 
Castro in 2006 due to Fidel Castro’s deteriorating health). Although the Caribbean 
country has gone recently through an additional transition with its new president Miguel 
Díaz-Canel, it was clear from his first address to the Cuban National Assembly that he is 
committed to the continuity of the socialist revolutionary principles and to the safeguard 
of Fidel Castro’s legacy. At first sight, Cuba might seem less isolated to the world due to 
its numerous international partnerships linked to the export of professional services, but 
the DPRK’s diplomatic engagement, albeit less talked about, exists vividly too. Indeed, 
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in 2018 alone, North and South Korea renewed dialogue following the Pyeongchang 
Winter Olympic Games, and the DPRK released three American citizens followingvisits 
from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Pyongyang, thus presenting potential avenues 
for post-Cold War reconciliation.   
Yet, reducing Cuba and the DPRK to residuals from the Cold War, and 
summarising them in relation to their singular political systems, rhetoric, marginal 
economic patterns and leading figures negates the story of resilience and ultimately 
survival that provides for the basis of their existences. For example, economic estimates 
situated the DPRK’s GDP per capita at around US$1,000 in 1991, and at US$1,300 in 
20165 while the World Bank situated Cuba’s GDP per capita at around US$2,280 in 1991, 
and at US$7,602 in 2015.6 While those figures put the DPRK squarely in the bottom 190th
and Cuba in the bottom half of the world table when comparing all countries by GDP per 
capita, it does not negate the fact that if they have managed to survive beyond the 
construct of the Cold War and Soviet system and network, evidence of societal 
transformation ought to exist. It is understood that these lines of inquiry are often not the 
focus of research agendas that seek to explain how rogues can be handled, silenced, and 
reformed. Hence, this paper considers Cuba and the DPRK as principal actors, and 
considers their own policies to develop and to modernize, all within the construct of an 
international world order that, for the better part of the last four decades, was largely led 
by the Washington Consensus. Both the DPRK and Cuba have maintained a warm 
diplomatic relationships with one another since 1960, and both countries have exchanged 
regular delegations. Yet, there are few evidence of in-depth economic and political 
partnerships and recent reports from the Economist Intelligence Unit show that Cuban 
exports to the DPRK were almost 8 times less than to South Korea (US$9m to Pyongyang 
in 2016 as opposed to US$67m to Seoul that same year).7 While it is likely that diplomatic 
dialogues touch on economic policies, we do not possess evidence that both countries 
have shared knowledge and resources with one another, and we will therefore treat both 
countries separately, though analysing them via a similar lens, which is the notion of 
sustainability, and how it is considered and when possible, implemented within Cuban 
and North Korean societies. Both countries have already committed to the 2015 
Millennium Development Goals (thereafter MDGs) by inscribing them within their 
national policies, and received assistance from the United Nations Development 
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Programmes.8 They have also committed to the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals 
(thereafter SDGs) and are engaged with the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Knowledge Platforms (thereafter SDKPs).9 The ramifications created by such a 
commitment are crucial for both Havana and Pyongyang: with Global Sustainable 
Development defined as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs,’10 the SDGs 
provide a useful framework to focus on specific key pillars of development for both 
countries. In order to understand how both countries have engaged with sustainability, 
the paper will proceed in three steps. First, it will retrace Cuba and the DPRK’s 
circumstances and history to paint the contemporary portraits of developing states at the 
periphery of the international system. Second, it will present a contextualised account of 
both countries’ survival environment post-Cold War and their strategic narratives in the 
fields of education and healthcare, two key pillars in the reduction of inequalities. Third, 
it presents a picture of two states who deal with similar political and economic constraints, 
and initiatives at times supported, tolerated or repressed by the political elites, and which 
provide a window of opportunity for change within societies that are more than the sum 
of their pasts.  
Lastly, and as a word of caution, it is important for the authors to address, at this 
point in the paper, potential discussions and reservations on suitability of comparison and 
the question of regime type by addressing both points in a candid and upfront manner. In 
regards to the suitability of comparing Cuba and Pyongyang, two countries located far 
away from one another and without obvious historical, or ethnic links, four central criteria 
of commonalities emerge: both countries have been colonized and dealt with political and 
societal reconstruction in the 1950s, both countries’ current political orders have been 
built on revolutionary paths and leading strongmen, both countries have crystalized their 
policies in light of a perceived common enemy embodied by the United States, and both 
countries face uncertain futures with their own leadership, economic, and societal 
organization with neo-patrimonial communist leadership that carry legacies, and that 
have fostered arrested development. In regards to the question of considering 
development, progress, and potential success within countries that have a difficult record 
on questions of human rights, political freedom and individual agency, the research 
presented here acknowledges the nature of both the Cuban and DPRK leadership and does 
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not seek to condone or condemn, but merely to objectively look and assess situations, 
polities and outcomes.  
A Traditional Understanding 
As noted earlier, there are no particular links that tie Cuba to the DPRK beyond 
their history and entanglement within the confines of the Cold War. Both countries are of 
similar sizes, but the DPRK’s population, at over 25 million, is more than twice that of 
Cuba while the Cuban GDP per capita is a little under USD$6,500, five times more than 
estimates for the DPRK.11 Pyongyang and Havana are separated by more than 7,000 
miles, belong to two different continents, and would therefore had very little chance to 
interact with one another, let alone develop a relationship if not for unforeseen historical 
events.  
Prior to the Cold War, both countries were small, and relatively irrelevant in terms 
of powers at a time when Great Britain was starting to decline, Japan was starting to rise, 
and the United States was mending its wounds after the American Civil War (1861-1865). 
Yet, Cuba and the DPRK share similar roles in history: their geographical locations and 
resources meant they could be of use to great powers. So, their story is tainted by being 
the objects of colonialism: After several attempts of independence wars, Cuba gained 
independence from Spain in 1898 after four centuries of colonization. The US 
intervention at the end of the war in 1898, also known as the Spanish American war, led 
however to a new era of unequal international relations. The island was under US 
occupation until 1902, when it gained its formal independence, but the US maintained a 
position of dominance through the Platt Amendment for several decades. At that time the 
DPRK did not exist, as it was just called Choson, the historical name for the Kingdom of 
Korea, and was on the verge of being annexed and then colonized by the Japanese empire 
after having been pried open by the United States in the late 19th century. When Japan 
surrendered in 1945, Choson was split into two zones of influence to remove colonial 
structures, before both Koreas created their own governments and fought a bitter 
brotherly war that only ended in an armistice and a status quo. In both cases, the United 
States was far from being a distant bystander: American economic interests in Cuba were 
often touted as needing protection, thus involvement, while American military presence 
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during the initial partition of the Koreas, during the Korean War via the United States’ 
command of the United Nations contingent, and up until now with its bases in Japan and 
South Korea, and in Guantanamo in the case of Cuba, have only helped fuelled rhetoric. 
As a result, both Cuba and the DPRK developed strong ‘anti-imperialist’ narratives they 
claim were stoked and fuelled by American meddling. This also led both countries to 
develop relationships within the Third World and with other anti-imperialists 
governments that were receptive to the idea of economic and political independence.  
At the beginning of the 1950s, the DPRK was a poor country attempting to rebuild 
its infrastructure following the Korean War. Its leader, young and charismatic Kim Il 
Sung, had fought the Japanese with passion and had offered dreams of peace, 
reconciliation, and equality to the Korean people upon the creation of the DPRK in 1948. 
Kim had been a member of the Chinese Communist Party12 and Soviet input over the 
North after the initial partition into two zones of influence in 1945 influenced economic 
development. Because the DPRK was economically crippled, it was imperative to 
generate wealth quickly. Hence, the Soviet answer was to bring out collectivization of the 
land, and introducing the Plan mentality.13 In essence, Marxist-Leninist principles were 
brought to the DPRK when it was in its infancy, before it developed later on, under Kim 
Il Sung’s influence, into a specific ideology called Chuch’e. By the end of the 1950s, 
Kim’s cult of personality had created a serious rift with Moscow, and cracks started to 
appear in the partnership. At the same time, Fidel Castro was leading a revolution against 
Fulgencio Batista based on middle class dissatisfaction at the lack of employment 
opportunities and political repression in a country that was relatively wealthy at the time. 
Shortly after the triumph of Castro’s Revolution, the Soviet Union sought to place 
missiles on Cuba to gain a strategic advantage over the United States and be within range 
of some of its largest cities. Fidel Castro welcomed Moscow’s offer, and the links 
between the two countries were tightened, especially after Fidel Castro declared in 1961 
that his revolution was a socialist one.   
The Cold War cemented Cuba and the DPRK’s positions as Soviet proxies, which 
created a deep ridge between them and the free world. The DPRK slowly took charge of 
its own military development after it had received substantial support from Moscow and 
Beijing during the Korean War, but especially after the Cuban missile crisis that had 
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Pyongyang concerned about a potential Soviet capitulation to the United States (Kim 
2014). The DPRK also engaged in diplomatic competition against its Southern brother in 
a bid to capture United Nations votes regarding which of the two Koreas was the 
legitimate one: this meant developing many diplomatic and economic relationships with 
countries that were newly independent in the 1950s and 1960s, and which would earn 
voting rights with the UN system. The DPRK benefitted from another advantage over 
South Korea: it was largely more industrial than the South (CIA declassified documents 
state that by 1972, the DPRK possessed 65% of the peninsula’s heavy industry14). This 
meant it could offer industrial goods to partners, and receive agricultural products it found 
itself short of. Meanwhile, Cuba found itself ensconced in a web of sanctions imposed by 
Washington for its involvement and support of Moscow during the Cuban missile crisis. 
The embargo, initially put in place in 1958 to prevent sales of arms to Cuba during the 
revolution, is estimated according to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to have cost Cuba a loss of US$130 billion.15 It 
also has become the most visible political and economic statement from the United States, 
and has, in many aspects, defined the decades Fidel Castro spent as Cuba’s leader. Both 
Cuba and the DPRK were singled-out as states sponsors of terrorism by the United States 
and put on the US Department of State ‘unofficial hit list’ though they have now both 
been removed.16 The DPRK withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and 
tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. This led to a slew of sanctions that were initiated 
by the United Nations Security Council aimed at isolating Pyongyang and force its regime 
to change (see Table 1). In both the Cuban and North Korean cases, sanctions have been 
enacted in a multilateral environment, by actors such as the United Nations or the 
European Union, but individual countries have also supplemented these by their own 
unilateral, or autonomous sanctions. The reasons for sanctions have been diverse: Havana 
and Pyongyang have been singled out because of their political systems, the political 
support they have given and received from other countries, their own policies that have 
limited personal freedom, their geostrategic importance, the danger they might represent 
because of specific military capacities but also because of their political longevity. 
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Table 1: Sanctions Regime  
Source: Compiled by authors using public domain, governmental and news resources.
The legacies of the Cold War are particularly salient for both Cuba and the DPRK 
as unlike many countries that have moved into a post-Communist phase, which has often 
involved political and economic liberalization, Havana and Pyongyang’s own political 
and economic systems have changed little. Thus, Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung, as 
original leaders and founders of contemporary Cuba and DPRK, have generated much 
debate within the academic community. The arguments have mostly centred on the 
concepts of status quo versus reformism: the status quo school suggests that the Cold War 
and the Soviet collapse have not factored in decisions made by the leaders, while the 
reformist schools sees an adjustment in their own beliefs and policies.17 If there is a degree 
of change within the countries, it has usually been overshadowed by an overreliance on 
qualifying Cuba and the DPRK as rogue states. Definitions in this realm abound, from 
Anthony Lake’s suggestion that rogue states ‘exhibit a chronic inability to engage 
constructively with the outside world’18 to Jasper Becker’s suggestion that rogue states 
internalized an insanity that could potentially upset the diplomatic world.19 Paul Hoyt’s 
2000 study defined an initial set of criteria based on a close reading of American public 
speaking records and policy documents, highlighting four categories of rogue behaviours: 
developing weapons of mass destruction capability (seeking to acquire, develop, and/or 
utilize WMDs and missile technology), posing a threat (political, military, regional and/or 
global), having linkages with terrorism (supporting and/or sponsoring, and using 
terrorism to undermine the Middle East Peace Process) and challenging international 
norms (weapons proliferation, UN/international sanctions, crimes against humanities, 
narcotics trafficking).20 According to him, Cuba and the DPRK feature prominently in 
About here 
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this narrative. Stuck within this rogue rhetoric that calls for imposing sanctions and 
maintaining isolation, the West and especially the United States as the main architect of 
the rogue state doctrine have dictated an order in which very little latitude is possible for 
current leaders Miguel Díaz-Canel and Kim Jong Un to operate in, whether they intend 
to follow in their predecessors’ footsteps or not. If anything, this had led to two 
unwelcomed developments. First, alienation has provided fodder for both the Cuban and 
North Korean leaderships to mask some of their poor economic choices and continue to 
legitimize some of their more oppressive policies by galvanizing popular support in light 
of perceived American unfair and restrictive directives.21 Second, it has created a 
smokescreen that has masked attempts to consider Cuba and the DPRK’s own policies 
and development efforts in anything that does not pertain to how they relate to 
irrationality, belligerence and all around craziness. What is expected, when confronting a 
rogue state, is for the rogue to change so that its current system is no more. As a result, it 
is often difficult to talk about change within Cuban and DPRK society unless it means 
complete regime change, and to analyse degrees of change at face-value, without political 
framing and bias. Yet, there is evidence of reforms with both countries launching partial 
liberalization efforts in specific market sectors, changes within their legal framework to 
accommodate Foreign Direct Investment22 and even in some cases, the emergence of a 
civil society23 and the emergence of private market initiatives, sometimes prodded by 
international forces.24 Finding how these compare to the traditional approaches presented 
by the Cuban and DPRK leadership is of importance when considering the notion of 
change and development within such seemingly close-off and isolated countries.  
Cuba and DPRK: Surviving Post-Cold War  
In 2006, severely ill, Fidel Castro decided to cede power to his brother Raul. Two 
years later, once officially elected president in February 2008, Raul Castro unexpectedly 
started to put in place a number of much needed diplomatic, economic and social reforms. 
The most striking one was without any doubt the restoration of diplomatic relations with 
the US in December 2014 leading to the visit of President Obama in March 2016, the first 
American president to visit its southern neighbour in nearly a century. Putting aside these 
recent changes, Cuba has for the past almost sixty years been a country on the periphery 
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of the world. Under economic pressure due to the US embargo, and even more since the 
fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba has had to find other ways to face a challenging economic 
situation. The island had not only lost a major political ally, but also its main source of 
economic support.  
To counterbalance this loss, Fidel Castro implemented in August 1990 what he 
called the ‘Special Period in Time of Peace,’ essentially a set of austerity measures typical 
to a country in war. Meanwhile, the United States took advantage of the vulnerable 
situation of the island to tighten further the embargo with the Toricelli Bill in 1992 and 
the Helms Burton Act in 1996, hoping to finally put an end to the Castro era. This made 
international trade with Cuba even more difficult, thus making the 1990s a very dark 
period for Cuban society as a whole. Little by little, the critical situation started improving 
with the new political and economic ally, Venezuela, and its then president Hugo Chávez. 
For years, Venezuela was supplying cheap oil to Cuba and purchasing medical and other 
professional services at very high rates from its communist counterpart. The relief was 
short-lived as Venezuela’s own economic struggles initiated a new economic crisis within 
Cuban society, and recurring power cuts and public transport shortages reminded the 
population of the struggles during the Special Period in Time of Peace. With Donald 
Trump taking office as president of the United States, the normalization of international 
relations between the US and Cuba has been put to a halt too. But even though he 
announced in his June 17, 2017 speech that he was cancelling the Obama Administration 
deal with Cuba, the current US posture is not as drastic as Trump presented it.  There is, 
however, a reversal when it comes to individual people-to-people tourism, which has now 
been banned, but also in the case of American businesses dealing with Cuban military 
services. This brings a further layer of uncertainty on the future of economic development 
initiated by international investments on the island, as can be seen mainly in the tourist 
sector but also in the telecommunication, construction and banking sector, among others, 
since some of these are facilitated by a Cuban company that is part of the military (CNN, 
June 17, 2017).  When talking about uncertainty, it is also worth mentioning the recent 
acoustic attacks on American diplomats in Cuba, which have led to many of them being 
sent back to the US and the American embassy not issuing visas to Cuban citizens for an 
unspecified period of time,25 as well as the recent change in leadership in Cuba, with 
Miguel Díaz-Canel being sworn in as new president on April 19, 2018. 
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Fidel Castro managed to play a leading role in Cuban politics for 49 years, first as 
prime minister from 1959 to 1976 and later as a president until 2008 which is 3 years 
longer that North Korea’s founder Kim Il Sung. As a young guerrilla fighter opposing 
Japanese colonialism in the 1930s and 1940s, Kim Il Sung’s rise to power in North Korea 
was bolstered by the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union upon the Koreas’ 
partition in 1945. Becoming president of the DPRK in 1948, Kim Il Sung embraced 
collectivization to develop the North’s economy, welcomed Soviet and Chinese military 
support to fight a civil war with the Republic of South Korea and developed a unique 
ideology called Chuch’e to support his cult of personality in spite of the USSR and the 
PRC frowning upon this new development. During the Cold War, the DPRK received 
extensive support from its Communist allies and benefited from technological assistance 
and purchasing credit. When the Soviet Union collapsed, so did the system and the DPRK 
had to reorganise its economy at a time when Kim Il Sung was getting physically weaker. 
A hereditary succession process was put in place in the 1970s in order to install his son 
Kim Jong Il in his place, and continue the family legacy. This could only be achieved, 
however, via tight legitimation processes that included a retrofitting of the North Korean 
myth narrative into everyday propaganda. In order to ensure its own security as well as 
to generate revenues, the DPRK had also slowly transitioned from a weapons recipient in 
the 1950s to a weapons producer by the 1980s. By the end of the Cold War, Pyongyang 
was developing nuclear energy, and was being engaged by the international community, 
worried about these potential developments. Upon Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, the 
DPRK had signed the Agreed Framework with an international consortium led by the 
United States, and which would see North Korea dismantle its nuclear reactors so that it 
would receive new, more efficient light-water reactors to balance its energy needs. 
Mistrust and miscalculations marred the 1990s, and the DPRK also suffered the collapse 
of its economy, further precipitated by severe floods and draughts that led to several 
million deaths. A large number of countries donated aid, which was administered via the 
World Food Program, and a number of NGOs. It seemed that by the end of the 1990s, the 
DPRK was receptive to international engagement, and a visit by Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang was swiftly followed by a historic meeting between 
Kim Jong Il and South Korean president Kim Dae Jung during a weekend organised for 
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long-separated Korean family members from the North and the South to meet for a few 
hours.  
In the past decade however, the DPRK had actuated its rogue status. While the 
United States suffered at the hands of terrorism and the 2002 Axis of Evil speech outlined 
North Korea as a dangerous country, the DPRK was further alienated despite a number 
of engagement prospects such as the Six-Party Talks that sought the denuclearization of 
the Korean peninsula. It was too late, however, as the DPRK tested its first nuclear 
weapons in 2006 after it had left the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003. Alienated and 
dangerous, the DPRK was also going through a number of domestic uncertainty as Kim 
Jong Il appeared gravely ill. Upon his death in 2011, the same hereditary succession 
process was applied, and Kim Jong Il’s son Kim Jong Un came into power. In 
Washington, President Barack Obama appeared to favour engagement but very little 
dialogue has occurred since then. Despite many international sanctions and seemingly 
few economic opportunities, the DPRK has managed to muddle through, using illegal 
channels to raise foreign currency while continuing to test nuclear weapons. As of 2018, 
the Agreed Framework is no longer active, but renewed dialogue between the two Koreas 
and a new diplomatic foray from the Trump Administration into the DPRK has led to 
renewed talks about potential denuclearisation.   
Sustainable Future Trajectories as a way to survive isolation  
At the United Nations Millennium Summit in 2000, all 189 United Nations and a 
large number of organizations committed to achieve specific goals by 2015. The goals 
were organized along a number of target areas: economic development (eradicating 
extreme power and hunger, developing a global partnership for development), education 
(achieving a universal primary education), societal (promoting gender equality and 
empowering women), health (reducing child mortality, improving maternal health and 
combatting HIV/AIDS, malaria and a number of other diseases), and the environment 
(ensuring sustainability).26 Even though Pyongyang and Havana often appear to be at the 
margins of the political and economic world order, both countries are members of the 
United Nations. Cuba is an original United Nations member, since the latter’s foundation 
in 1945. North Korea’s relationship with the United Nations has been more convoluted: 
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the United Nations authorized force for the first time in its history after United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 82 on June 25, 1950 failed to stop North Korea’s invasion 
of the South.27 Both Koreas were eventually admitted, though separately, as full members 
on September 17, 1991 via Resolution 46/1.28
Both the DPRK and Cuba have seized upon the 2015 MDGs, and more recently 
on the 2030 SDGs. Such attitudes might be surprising given their isolation and belligerent 
attitudes in a number of sectors, but for two countries that have funded their ideology and 
legitimacy on a political discourse based on socialist principles, it is unsurprising to see 
a clear match between the social policies they advocate and several global United Nations 
goals. Indeed, there are a few global areas in which the DPRK and Cuba can be vocal and 
involved in a narrative of progress, development and change. This is especially salient in 
regards to two goals: Quality Education (SDG 4) and Good Health and Well-being (SDG 
3). Both goals also feed into the broader scope of Reduced Inequalities (SDG 10) –and 
consequently Gender Equality (SDG 5), which can be considered a basic principle of the 
socialist ideology. To this effect, and even more in the post-cold war era, Pyongyang and 
Havana have managed, each in their own way, to expand some of the social policies they 
had always advocated. We suggest in this paper that this is albeit –and possibly due to– a 
tumultuous political and economic environment at times, and realign them to fit with the 
various SDKPs advocated at the United Nations level.  
Education 
The DPRK’s engagement with education efforts is radically different from 
countries with similarly low GDP per capita and development indexes. Yet, the DPRK’s 
commitment to education is far from new. As early as the 1950s, Pyongyang utilized 
political ties with its Soviet partners to provide learning opportunities for its people. The 
DPRK’s Education Commission calls itself a ‘country of learning and education’ with 
more recent endeavours focusing on Information Technology, and a broadening of 
teaching methods and contents.29 But the DPRK’s education system is one of the most 
developed part of the country’s system, though it is true that it has, and still is used to a 
great extent to manage the North Korean population by focusing also on political 
education and indoctrination. Upon the creation of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung developed an 
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education system that was based on the Soviet system, and transformed the country from 
what was largely an illiterate population into a country boasting solid educational 
achievements. Indeed, the state-sponsored education system offers free education from 
kindergarten to university, and more than 70% of North Koreans have achieved secondary 
school qualifications and a further 10% with graduate and post-graduate university 
qualifications.30 MDG indicators are especially strong when it comes to rate of students 
who were supplied with textbooks (over 68%).31  North Korean sources assess their own 
progress in an often candid manner, and have praised the World Organization and other 
international humanitarian efforts for their support. They also conversely blame a large 
part of the socio-economic difficulties on natural disasters that occurred in the 1990s as 
well as on economic sanctions.32 SDG4 features in the new 2017-2021 Strategic 
Framework as a priority – Social Development Services, and the DPRK is recognized for 
having achieved MDG2 as it ‘possesses a comprehensive nationwide infrastructure, 
which has enabled free and virtually universal primary and secondary school enrolment, 
up to the twelfth year, including gender parity.’33 The DPRK has engaged in a number of 
education partnership with foreign entities, in order to tip the scale and influence its own 
development by injecting more current technological content within its education system. 
In 2004, the Goethe Institute opened in Pyongyang and was the first foreign reading room 
of its kind in North Korea and was comprised of a large number of technological resources 
before it closed in 2009. More recently, Pyongyang University of Science and 
Technology (thereafter PUST), which opened in 2009, offered a technical and business 
curriculum to North Korean elite students, and taught in large part by foreign faculty in 
the fields of food engineering (NK News, 20 May 2014). Recent UNSCR sanctions on 
specific metals and chemicals make it difficult for PUST to operate as fully-fledged 
university, and the recent American travel ban to the DPRK has reduced PUST faculty 
heavily since a large number of teaching staff were US citizens who were working pro-
bono (UPI, April 7, 2016). This is particularly unfortunate as a large part of PUST’s work 
toward stabilizing the DPRK’s future development was done in the field of health, 
dentistry and medicine, as the university opened its medical school in 2015. As a result 
of the travel ban, no medical-school classes were scheduled to be offered in Fall 2017 
(Korea Herald, August 13, 2017).  
In a similar way, Fidel Castro made clear from the very beginning of the Cuban 
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Revolution that one of his top priorities was to provide free education to all. As Cuba 
declared itself a socialist country in 1961, it also initiated a countrywide literacy 
campaign. Its goal was to eradicate illiteracy from Cuba, which was quickly achieved on 
December 22, 1961, when Castro announced Cuba a territory free of illiteracy.34 This 
priority can also be seen in the high share of its national budget that Cuba has placed in 
education from the very start, providing free universal education to its population. This 
has also continued through with Raul Castro, and even though economic reforms have 
reduced the extremely high percentage spent in education to 9% of its GDP (Cubadebate,
January 6, 2017) it is still much higher than first world countries such as the United States 
or France.35 Although it is true that here also the education system has been used as a way 
of politically educating and indoctrinating the Cuban people, the quality of Cuba’s 
education system has been praised by many including the World Bank in 2014: “No Latin 
American school system today, except possibly Cuba’s, is very close to high standards, 
high academic talent, high or at least adequate compensation, and high professional 
autonomy that characterize the world’s most effective education systems, such as those 
found in Finland; Singapore; Shanghai, China; South Korea; Switzerland; the 
Netherlands; and Canada.”36
While the diplomatic ties of North Korea and the international community 
regarding education are rather inward-facing, Cuba has managed not only to achieve 
SDG4 within its own territory, but also to play a key role in the achievement of quality 
education at a global level. During the Special Period in Times of Peace, Cuba went 
through a very serious economic crisis. Fidel Castro had lost its main political and 
economic ally and it was time to think of new ideas to save Cuba from its current situation. 
Cuba’s export of professional services had been a success since the start of the revolution, 
as soon as it was set up, and the oldest Castro brother saw an opportunity here to find a 
way out of its economic struggles. Cuba’s achievement of universal education had already 
been successfully exported in Africa during the Soviet years. With the rise of Hugo 
Chavez and of the left in other Latin American countries, there was a sudden opportunity 
for exporting these services as well as the Cuban education professionals to the island’s 
southern neighbours. In 2001, Fidel asked a previous teacher of the 1961 literacy 
campaign, Leonela Relys Días, to set up the literacy programme “Yo sí puedo” [Yes, I 
can],” directed to people older than 15 years-old who have never attended school, or could 
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not be considered literate due to a very limited access to education. “Yes I can” was set 
up as an internationalist programme, which could be applied to other cultures and 
languages. The programme, which has been called “a model of literacy” by Unesco37 and 
led to Cuba being awarded the Unesco King Sejon Literacy Prize in 2006, has since been 
used in 28 countries, leading to the literacy of more than 9 million people worldwide 
(Granma, November 6, 2015). With this initiative, Cuba not only helped heal its 
economy38 and developed educational diplomacy countering in such a way the isolation 
imposed by the US embargo, it also did it in such a way that showed a clear global concern 
for universal education, as well as a continued engagement with the MDGs and the more 
recent Global SDGs. 
Healthcare 
The DPRK’s commitment to healthcare also goes back to the very beginning of 
the country’s political creation. At the 37th Session of the People’s Committee of North 
Korea that took place on May 21, 1947, a young Kim Il Sung published ‘On Improving 
the Public Health Service’, and extoled the commitment the country had to improve anti-
epidemics, medical treatment as well as training for health workers (KCNA, May 20, 
2017). Seventy years later, it is difficult to evaluate the extent of the health crisis in the 
DPRK, mainly because the country is reluctant to provide specific information on health 
care, and especially numbers that might be seen as unflattering, as opposed to the high 
literacy numbers, for example. Coupled with the fact that few external agencies can have 
ground access to the DPRK, it is not always possible to have an accurate picture of the 
DPRK’s situation and many agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA), the World Food Program (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) 
echo these concerns.39 The latest figures to evaluate the DPRK’s situation can be found 
in the ‘Humanitarian Needs and Priority 2015’ and suggest target lag in areas of diet, food 
security, nutrition source as well as general access to health service, especially when it 
comes to services to disabled population. Access to clean water is also reported to be 
difficult in some areas, with direct links with education and child development as the 
report talks about poor health conditions in schools as well. The 2017-2021 SDKPs 
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stresses the importance of connecting the local to the global by building relationship and 
national capacity, but this might be difficult in light of more recent sanctions rounds as 
well as the lack of interest on the part of donors to support projects in the DPRK: only 
about 16% of projects needed received funding in 2015 ($18 million-worth out of an 
requested $110 million).40 Yet, the DPRK can still, at times, count on time-tested 
relationships with partners remaining connected to the DPRK. This is the case with 
Poland, who signed a number of cooperation plans on health and medical sciences with 
the DPRK in 1992 (PAP News Wire, July 28, 1992).  
Even though sanction rounds have made it more difficult for the DPRK to have 
access to specific products, infrastructures are basic but functional, but a lack of specific 
drugs has made it difficult for the DPRK to provide sustainable care for new-born and for 
their mothers for example,41 and the DPRK has suffered from donor fatigue, as noted 
earlier. Pyongyang is thus seeking to address this development priority by positioning 
itself within the SDKPs and considering resource transfer. The DPRK has worked in 
partnership with a number of agencies such as WHO and UNICEF, especially on 
vaccination campaign. The DPRK’s use of pentavalent vaccine to combat meningitis, 
tetanus, Hepatitis B, pneumonia and diphtheria was also highlighted by public figures 
such as the Minister of Public Health Choe Chang Sik who suggested that this would 
leave to ‘a good prospect for the reduction of child mortality and morbidity and for 
achieving MD goals’ (KCNA, July 12, 2012). Recent external international reports have 
highlighted the process achieved in a number of areas, especially when it comes to the 
reduction of global health risks: this is particularly notable in regards to vaccination 
programme and tuberculosis control, with diphteria, tenatus and pertussis (DTP) vaccine 
coverage rising from 37% in 1997 to 96% in 2013,42 thanks to international partnerships 
and support from the GAVI Alliance and Global Fund.43  The DPRK is also engaged in 
a number of health partnerships abroad, and especially with a number of African 
countries: this pattern is based on the premise that the DPRK, despite its economic 
shortcomings, has, according to the World Health Organization, a rather large density of 
physicians for its own population (3.507 per 1,000 inhabitants). Those physicians lack 
access to drugs and practical training because of the DPRK’s economic and sanction 
situation and as result, the DPRK has sent a number of physicians abroad to provide 
medical services in exchange for money: this has been the case in the Republic of Congo 
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(where the domestic physicians density is 0.108 per 1,000 inhabitants), Uganda (0.093), 
and Tanzania (0.022).44 The physicians have, at times, operated at the margins of legality, 
with poor command of either local language and English, no business license, and a latent 
usage of fake drugs: in the case of Tanzania, the government has recently ordered the 
closure of two Korean clinics in Dar es Salaam45 while the Republic of Congo has sought 
to manage the problem of illegal licenses by signing a bilateral health protocol with the 
North Korean government on March 24, 2017, with the Health and Population Minister 
Jacqueline Lydia Mikolo suggesting avenues for improved health cooperation for both 
parties.46 The DPRK has signed a number of health protocols in recent years, including 
with Angola and Gabon. While they were about 180 North Korean physicians working in 
Angola, and regular DPRK delegations visited hospitals and medical facilities (Angola 
Press Agency, December 15, 2015), public health delegation visits have also taken place 
in Gabon to review infrastructure (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, March 31, 
2010). It is unclear what exact arrangements have been taking place, but it is likely that 
the DPRK would seek opportunities to place some of its medical contingent to guarantee 
revenues as well. As suggested in an article from The Diplomat by Dr Shannon Perry, an 
epidemiologist who has spent extensive time in the DPRK to work on tuberculosis 
laboratories, DPRK doctors are isolated from the international medical community and 
are seeking ways to stay connected to the medical world, conferences, as well as 
international standards (The Diplomat, April 10, 2015). To this extent, the DPRK’s own 
health sector and the DPRK’s ability to implement some of the SDPKs will require 
engagement with the international community: while maintaining doctors in third 
countries enables the DPRK to raise revenues, it also offers the possibility to engage with 
the international medical community, and with some more advanced actors such as Cuba 
as well.  
The Cuban communist society has always received a lot of praise for its own 
system (Minrex, July 16, 2014), and is exemplar in its commitment to a number of the 
global SDGs. Cuba’s priority of providing universal healthcare and access to affordable 
medicine goes back to the early years of the Revolution and it also reflects the socialist 
ideology of the revolutionary regime. Cuba’s primary healthcare system is based on 
preventive medicine, which has led to extremely low level of infant and maternal 
mortality47 as well as high levels of life expectancy48 in each case comparable to those of 
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first world countries (El País, February 10, 2017). Although it lacks efficiency and its 
infrastructure needs to be urgently updated, the share of Cuba’s GDP invested in health 
(11.1% of its GDP in 2014)49 is much higher than many other countries in the world, and 
here again competes with first world countries. For the same year, Germany spent 11.2% 
of its GDP on health, Belgium 10.6%, and Spain 9%, to give a few examples. This is 
noticeable in surprising results in medical research, such as the recent discovery of a 
treatment for prevention of mother-to-child HIV50 and syphilis transmission (The 
Guardian, June 30, 2015), or the Cimavax vaccine51 for lung cancer patients, as well as 
in the medical education system. According to the WHO, Cuba had in 2014 a density of 
physicians of 7.519, when first world countries such as the United States had 2.554 
(2013), the United Kingdom 2.806 (2015) and Spain 3.819 (2014).52
If North Korea’s health agreements with other countries intends to increase access 
to healthcare and medicine for its own people, Cuba’s concern for universal healthcare 
here again was internationalized from very early on. In 1960, Fidel Castro sent a first 
medical brigade to Chile to help out with the local needs to treat those who had been 
affected by a major earthquake. Since then, Cuba has sent more than 32,500 healthcare 
professionals in a total of 158 countries53 (Granma, July 15, 2016) all over the world to 
help communities in need, either due to natural disasters, epidemics or to a shortage of 
doctors in specific regions. Cuba’s International Solidarity Programme went through a 
drastic increase after Hugo Chavez became Venezuela’s new president in 1999 and 
agreed rapidly with Fidel Castro to establish close ties between both countries. His newly 
implemented ideology, which he called, “Socialism of the 21st century” found its main 
inspiration in Castro’s revolution. The Cuban government rapidly saw there an 
opportunity to regain economic growth, and signed several agreements with its Caribbean 
neighbour, one of them being the oil-for-doctors program. Castro would send doctors to 
Venezuela to provide free healthcare to the poor and in underserved areas, while Chavez 
would pay for Cuban services with oil. Thousands of Cuban doctors were needed in 
Venezuela, which led to a mass production of physicians in Cuba. Not only had Cuba 
found a way to start healing from the economic crisis of the Special Period, it was doing 
it while showing at the same time a clear engagement with global universal healthcare 
and the MG. This Cuban healthcare mission in Venezuela, also known as Misión Barrio 
Adentro [Inside the neighbourhood], has been referred to as an example of Primary 
21 
Healthcare by bodies such as the Pan American Health Organization and Unicef, among 
others.54
Cuba has however gone even further in its commitment to global universal 
healthcare. Not only is Cuba exporting physicians, it also offers a sustainable way of 
providing healthcare by training local doctors, but also by helping founding medical 
schools in other countries, such as Ethiopia, East Timor and Haiti, among others.55 In 
addition, Fidel Castro created in 1999 the Escuela Latinoamericana de Medicina (ELAM) 
[Latin American School of Medicine]. His intention was to develop its internationalist 
commitment with the improvement of healthcare in the world, and in particular, for the 
poorer communities. ELAM offers free medical education to students, mainly from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, who come from all over the world, even from the United 
States. Upon graduation, ELAM students are expected to go back to their often 
underserved communities to provide healthcare, contributing in such a way towards the 
goal of global universal healthcare. Latest numbers state that 24.000 physicians from 84 
different countries have graduated from ELAM since it opened its doors almost ten years 
ago (Granma, April 8, 2016). There is no doubt that the Cuban international healthcare 
program has had a tremendous impact on the Cuban economy.56 Some also refer to it as 
medical diplomacy,57 stating that while offering their services to other countries, Cuba 
also exploits the situation to counter the isolation imposed by the US sanctions, while at 
the same time expecting these countries to vote in their favour at the UN when the vote 
against the US embargo takes place. In 2015, the two only countries still voting in favour 
of the US embargo at the UN were the United States and Israel58. Having such an impact 
on global healthcare has also helped shifting the international discourse on lack of basic 
human rights in Cuba towards a discourse of admiration and praise about their healthcare 
system and international solidarity program. Others have also criticized the selective 
humanitarianism of Cuban internationalism, reducing the number of doctors on the island 
due to the high number of physicians working abroad.59 However, putting aside the 
possible non-humanitarian interests that might be at the origin of this solidarity 
programme, Cuba’s way of treating healthcare at a national and international level 
undoubtedly corresponds to several of the objectives listed under the third SDG.
Conclusions: What Development Possibilities in a Politically-Fragmented World? 
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Despite their many differences, both Cuba and the DPRK have a lot in common, 
and not only from an ideological point of view. Some key aspects of the UN SDGs agenda 
are clearly reflected in both countries, despite their isolated economies. Two of them 
stand out, encapsulated in a third: education, healthcare and reduction of inequalities. We 
argue that the main difference between the two countries and their position towards the 
achievement of the SDGs is that while the DPRK is struggling to achieve it within its 
own territory and uses diplomatic ties to increase access to quality education and quality 
healthcare for its own population, Cuba has not only achieved SDG3 and SDG4 for its 
own people, but it has also developed a strong network of diplomatic relations all of the 
world by exporting health and education services where these were needed. Both 
countries’ socialist ideologies have led to them prioritizing universal health, education 
for all, and equality, yet more recent initiatives have also shown their strong commitment 
to the SDGs. 
In Cuba, for example, both the education and the health care system have gone 
through recent changes, which reflect in each case their engagement with the 2015 MDGs 
and the 2030 SDGs. Both the Yo sí puedo literacy program, as well as Cuba’s mass 
production of healthcare workers in order to deploy many of them abroad as part of their 
international solidarity programme are in line with the UN Sustainable Development 
agenda, increasing access to global universal education and quality health care.  In the 
DPRK, it is the education system that has shown important recent changes. Opening it to 
foreign involvement and setting up joint academic programmes with international 
universities has led to conferences taking place in the DPRK. On the health front, but 
deeply connected to education, opportunities to rent-seek abroad by sending doctors also 
enable the DPRK’s medical corps to be exposed to new environments, new techniques 
and potentially new opportunities. Despite their different approaches, in both cases the 
MDGs and SDGs are clearly used for political and economic purposes, with catch-phrase 
reprised in both countries’ official publications and propaganda outlets geared toward its 
own citizens. What is also important to highlight is that both countries currently operate, 
when it comes to the education and health sectors, without the impetus and direction of a 
patron: this was not the case in the past where the Soviet Union, as well as the People’s 
Republic of China were supporting some of the infrastructure in both Cuba and the 
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DPRK. This is particularly crucial when it comes to Pyongyang: there is an underlying 
assumption that China, because of the size of its economy and its investment potential, is 
able to manipulate the DPRK, but most of Chinese investment into the DPRK is organised 
by private Chinese individuals under joint-venture enterprises that focus on sectors that 
can be profitable (i.e. textile industry, natural resources). There is little scope for China 
to invest in the DPRK’s educational or health sector as there just isn’t enough financial 
return in such endeavours.  
It is also not surprising that both Cuba and the DPRK have made clear that, despite 
their commitment to the MDGs first, and the SDGs more recently, the UN should not 
attempt to impact on their own vision of security and sovereignty. Most studies on Cuba 
and the DPRK have not managed to move away from the rogue state discourse, making 
it difficult for their analysis to focus on the sustainable activities taking place in both 
countries as well as their impact at a global level. Although there are still many 
unanswered questions, this paper has intended to initiate the discussion on how seemingly 
economically and politically isolated countries, such as Cuba and the DPRK, do indeed 
also work towards achieving the notion of sustainability and well-being at national and/or 
global level, and it has shown that there are undeniably agents of change in both societies 
that support sustainable transformations. Leaving politics aside, it is unfortunate that 
despite these recent changes, new sanctions impacting both countries seem to restrain 
these transformations to develop further. As mentioned in the report on Cuba published 
by The Economist Intelligence Unit in 2017, the two main barriers to development are 
the “island’s dilapidated infrastructure” and US sanctions.60 This applies to the DPRK 
too.61 As long as the sanctions remain in place, both countries will have to continue 
finding other pathways to survive economically and politically, while at the same time 
maintaining their commitment towards the UN SDGs. 
Based on these initial conclusions, there are a number of new inquiries that should 
be looked at. We will highlight two here. First, there is an underlying amount of 
cooperation that also takes place between Cuba and the DPRK because of the nature of 
their communist development: studying how much cooperation exists between the two, 
and whether or not there is an amount of coordination that takes place in order for them 
to sustain their position within the system is important. Second, we believe the 
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international community should look more in detail at new patterns of cooperation and 
endeavours where international help and support is needed, and the degree to which this 
support is then integrated within both the Cuban and North Korean societies. At a time 
when providing evidence of impact is so crucial for the viability of many projects, it 
seems necessary to also concentrate on tracing potential changes within both societies, to 
see how it is possible to have a positive impact on people’s life, with the caveat that this 
impact will most likely have to occur within the constraints of, for better or worse, the 
existing leadership.  
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